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MATTHEW D. ASBELL: My name is Matthew Asbell. I am an IP attorney
at Offit Kurman, which is a law firm up and down the East Coast of the United
States with 275 attorneys. I am also an adjunct professor at Fordham Law. I am
pleased to be moderating the session. To start, I'd like to say thanks to you Hugh
Hansen, Courtney, Sven, and the others, the Fordham Institute for having us today
and for this great conference.
We have a really interesting lineup. We're talking about US trademark law.
We're talking about an update on US cases. We're talking about the new Trademark
Modernization Act, and how that has been implemented. We'll be talking about the
SHOP SAFE Act, regarding online counterfeits, and we'll be talking about
reclaiming of domain names. Our speakers today, we have Professor Marshall
Leaffer, I guess you can give us a wave, who is a professor at Indiana University,
Maurer School of Law.
We have Jenny Simmons from the International Trademark Association,
with their big annual meeting coming up. We have Rebecca Tushnet. I'm not sure
if I'm pronouncing that correctly, so I hope-- Okay, good. I got a thumbs-up. I've
seen your name a million times, but never got the opportunity to pronounce it, from
Harvard Law. Pleasure to have you. We have Gerald Levine, who is from Levine
and Samuels. I do see Maria Scungio on there. I'm not sure of your role, so maybe
you can chime in so that I know how to involve you.
MARIA A. SCUNGIO: Thanks, Matt. I'm one of the panelists to join the
speaker conversation after presentation. I'm in private practice at Robinson & Cole,
but I'm also fortunate to be an adjunct professor at Fordham, teaching trademark
law this spring semester. I'll be working on the student's exam hypo questions to
submit on Monday.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: Excellent. So glad to have you and good to meet
you. I knew your name from somewhere. Great. With that, we're going to kick it
off. If you want to read full bios, of course, they're available in the materials. With
that we're going to kick it off. The first thing I'd like to do is put it out to the audience
and see if there are particular questions or comments about the subject matter that
we're interested in. Then I'm going to call on each of the separate speakers, and then
we'll get approximately seven minutes for their main subject matter. Then we'll
have further discussion. Do we have anyone in the audience that would like to ask
a question or make a comment with regards to US trademark law developments to
get us started? Silent bunch you are. Please do chime in if you wish to participate.
We'd like to keep this interactive, if possible. With that, I'm going to pass this along
to Marshall Leaffer. Professor Leaffer, please go ahead with your presentation on
the US case law developments.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Thank you , Matthew. I'm listed as 10 minutes. I
don't want to have any special privileges. Anyway, I'll try to be concise.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: I might cut it down to five. I've got a lot of power
here. Now you can go ahead.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: I'm going to talk about three cases which I
believe are particularly significant. My first case is the Coca-Cola v. Meenaxi,1 an
action for cancellation before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
1
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As a background to this case, US courts have never explicitly adopted the
well-known marks doctrine of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. Article 6bis is
an exception to territoriality. It requires member countries to refuse registration or
cancel the registration or use of a well-known mark by an unauthorized party who
uses it on confusingly similar goods.
Some US case law seems to have given de facto recognition of the doctrine.
Other courts, however, have simply rejected the doctrine. These courts have
declared that trademark rights are territorial and that the provisions of the Paris
Convention are not self-executing in US law. Now to Meenaxi. In the 1990s, CocaCola entered the market in India through the acquisition of the mark's Thums Up
and the Limca. Coke wanted to sell its branded products in India, but it decided not
to do so because the Indian government required companies to disclose the full
formula of the products.
In India, Coke heavily promoted Thums Up and Limca, which became
major bestsellers in Indian market. In the meantime, Meenaxi, registered Thums
Up and Limca in the United States. Even though Coke had no formal rights in the
market in the US, Coke brought a petition to cancel Meenaxi's registration for the
mark's Thums Up and Limca. Coke based this action for cancellation as
misrepresentation of source under Section 14 of the Lanham Act.
The evidence established that Meenaxi engaged in blatant misuse of the
marks in a manner calculated to trade on the goodwill and reputation of Coca-Cola.
Meenaxi was selling Limca and the Thums Up in ethnic food stores and Indian food
stores. The Board found it significant that the Meenaxi's activities related to Thums
Up and Limca were not just isolated instances but formed a part of a broader pattern
of copying the word-marks and logos of other Indian brands. In ruling in favor of
Coca-Cola, the Board repeatedly cited the 2016 case of Bayer v. Belmora, in which
the Fourth Circuit granted Bayer's request to cancel Belmora’s registration for
Flanax in the US. Flanax is the name used in the Mexican market for the analgesic
Aleve. Flanax was never used by Bayer in the US market and had no registration
on the mark, but Bayer was able to cancel Belmora’s registration of Flanax on the
grounds that was misleading even though Bayer had no rights to the mark in the
United States.
What is the upshot of this decision? First, owners of trademarks outside of
the US do not have to sell products bearing the marks in the US to have standing to
cancel registered marks used by another party to misrepresent the source of the
goods. Secondly, the TTAB appears to have given a de facto recognition to the
well-known mark's doctrine to remedy just the kind of trademark squatting that
occurred in this case.
The second case I'd like to discuss is Apple v. Social Tech, 2 which reminds
us that trademark rights in the US are acquired only by their bona fide use in
commerce. In this case, Social Tech sued Apple over the use of the trademark
Memoji, for use on an app. The Appellate Court affirmed in favor of Apple. It ruled
that Social Tech had no protectable rights of Memoji because the company failed
to use it legitimately in commerce.

2

4 F. 4th 811 (9th Cir 2021).

3

Session 7D
Here are the facts. In 2016, Social Tech filed in intent to use application for
the mark Memoji for use on apps and software. Social Tech did very little for two
years, other than ask for an extension on Notice of Allowance. They did do a few
things. Social Tech wrote a business plan, funded itself internally for $100,000, and
created some promotional material.
In the interim, Apple acquired Memoji from another company’s suspended
trademark application for the same mark. In 2018, Apple released a public version
of its new mobile operating system that included an operational version of the
Memoji app. Until Apple's announcement, Social Tech had not written a line of
code. Then, and only then, did Social Tech show an interest in actually using the
Memoji mark. During three weeks after Apple's announcement, Social Tech's cofounder and president, Samuel Bonet wrote in an e-mail, "It's time to get paid,
gentlemen." In a series of other revealing emails admitted that the app needed a
little work to get perfect. He stated “If we can get close, initially we can start to test
and put it in commerce.” Bonet again, wrote, "In other news, the initial letter has
been sent to Apple. The processes began, peace and wealth." Bonet also wrote that
Social Tech would release the application for Android in the Google Play Store,
proclaiming, "We are lining up our information in preparation for a nice lawsuit
against Apple. We are looking good. Get your Lamborghini picked out." Clearly,
Social Tech was trying to push its mark through the registration process, so it could
file a trademark suit and get paid. It put its barely operational app in commerce for
the purposes of filing a lawsuit which had about 5,000 downloads.
The panel held that the adoption of the mark without the bona fide use and
commerce to reserve rights for the future does not establish rights in the mark. Use
and commerce requires use of a genuine character. It must be sufficiently public to
distinguish the mark goods in an appropriate section of the public. On the question
of bona fide use, one must consider the “totality of the circumstances.” The panel
agreed with the District Court, that considering the totality of the circumstances,
Social Tech's use of Memoji mark was not bona fide use in commerce. Accordingly
Apple was entitled to cancel Social Tech's trademark registration.
My third case is Select Comfort v. Baxter. 3 This case concerns initial
interest confusion, referred to yesterday in another trademark session. The theory
of initial interest confusion involves situations where consumer initially may have
been confused about the source of defendant's goods or services, but that confusion
is dispelled before a final purchase.
Initial interest confusion is a controversial, non-point-of-sale confusion
doctrine, and some circuits have been reluctant in adopting it at all. In this case, the
Eighth Circuit held that the doctrine was a viable infringement theory and could be
used in proper circumstances. The facts are these, Social Comfort alleged that
Baxter used its registered trademarks and confusing similar manner to advertise
Baxter's mattresses and divert consumers to its website and phone lines, instead of
Select Comfort's. Baxter operated under the name, Personal Comfort. It used online
advertising, including paid search ads, some of which used portions of the Select
Comfort trademarks.

3
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Initial interest confusion was involved in this case because Baxter’s online
ads brought Select Comfort to mind, diverting customers to Personal Comfort's call
center. However, at some point in the call center conversation, customers would
learn that they had not contacted Select Comfort. The District Court granted the
summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the relevant consumers
were sophisticated as a matter of law. Citing Eighth Circuit precedent, the Court
rejected plaintiff's theory of initial interest confusion.
The Court of Appeal reversed. It held that the District Court erred on the
availability of “initial interest confusion” as a viable infringement theory. The main
point of contention in this case involved the issue of consumer sophistication.
Mattresses are a relatively expensive investment, but on the other hand, mattresses
are bought infrequently, so customers might be susceptible to online ploys.
The court concluded that the issue of consumer sophistication should be left
to the jury, but because the initial interest confusion theory was a viable doctrine,
summary judgment was in error. Nevertheless, one might read some skepticism in
the opinion, and it falls short of an unqualified embrace of the initial interest
confusion doctrine. The court states that the doctrine doesn't apply when relevant
consumers are careful and professional purchasers. After Baxter, however,
advertisers should use care in displaying competitors' trademarks in online ads or
in domains.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: As far as I can tell, I think you're okay. The clock
didn't seem to be moving for a while and then magically it was at two minutes. So,
you're done. It's great. Glad to have you. Are there questions or comments from the
peanut gallery, the audience, or co-panelists? Not hearing any. With that, we will
go to Jenny Simmons who will be talking to us about the Trademark Modernization
Act of 2020.
JENNIFER SIMMONS: Thank you so much, Matt, and great presentation
there, Marshall. I don't have a PowerPoint flag. I'm just going on the theory that
trademarks is as fun as a barrel of monkeys, and that's my trademark behind me
from my nursery and my home, [laughs] anyway. All right, the Lanham Act, as we
all know, has been like the quintessential trademark law in the US since it was
enacted back in 1946. Over the years, we've seen a couple of amendments here and
there, most recently with the Trademark Modernization Act or the TMA. The TMA
came into force in December of 2020, and many of the provisions went into effect
on December 18th of 2021.
The TMA was focused on answering one of the biggest questions that are
out there in modern trademark law. Which is, "How do we clean up the trademark
register?" We all know that the trademark register is the lifeblood of trademark law,
and we have to maintain the integrity of the register in order to really make the US
trademark law function properly. When it's cluttered and inaccurate, it just
undermines the integrity and the trust placed in the USPTO, and it impedes the real
functionality of the register for the people that rely on it.
The TMA gives us a couple of new non-use cancellation proceedings, which
is primarily what I'm going to discuss today. The non-use cancellation is the
removal of an existing trademark from the trademark register due to non-use. As
the result of the TMA, we now have re-examination proceedings and expungement
5
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proceedings. Both of which can be initiated either by a petitioner or by the director.
The idea of meaning to remove deadwood or registered marks that are not actually
being used from the register. It comes from the fact that the US is a use-based
system, and the goal of these proceedings is to give petitioners a cheaper, faster,
alternative than filing a contested inter-party proceeding before the trademark trial
and appeal form.
Now, before I get into the specifics of these TMA proceedings, I just first,
would like to thank the USPTO. They have worked tirelessly for such a long time
to make sure that the law is technically accurate and that it's implemented in the
best way possible. I also have to thank the House Judiciary Committee, which has
helped numerous roundtables prior to the introduction of the TMA. Congressional
staff were always eager to work with us and solicit feedback and incorporate logical
changes that just made really good sense. I also would like to just take a second to
thank Hugh Hansen and Fordham for giving INTA this stage to speak on every year
about timely topics that our brand owners really hear about.
I would be absolutely remiss if I did not mention the great webinars that the
USPTO has put out on this subject. Amy Cotton in particular, has done a fantastic
job of explaining the ends and the outs of these new processes. With that and
knowing that we're all a bunch of lawyers here and new processes make us all a
little bit anxious, I'm going to walk through these super carefully, starting with reexam.
Re-examination is basically a method which requires a youth-based
application for a trademark to be considered for re-exam. A re-examination is
targeted at a registered trademark, which has already allegedly been in use, but
which the petitioner alleges did not begin use on the relevant date. Whether that
date is the date of filing of the trademark or the date the registered claims the
trademark began its use. The time limit for filing a re-exam petition is the moment
the trademark is registered up to five years after registration, so zero to five years.
It can be filed by any party, you're not required to say who the real party and interest
is. Now, expungement on the other hand, trademarks that are subject to
expungement are trademarks which have never been used and are subject to
removal due to their extended period of non-use. These trademarks can be either
domestic or foreign. Expungement only becomes an option for a petitioner three
years after registration, and an expungement can be filed up to 10 years old after
the registration. It's basically 3 to 10 years old.
There is one caveat there, is that until December 27th, 2023, a proceeding
can be requested for any registration that is at least three years old, regardless of
that 10-year limit. It can also be filed by any party, not just a real party and interest,
and keep in mind that these proceedings do not get into intent. That's for TTAB,
this is not about abandonment.
Remember, once you file these petitions, you cannot withdraw it. Let's just
carefully walk through quickly the process to file a petition. It's much the same for
re-exam and for expungement, couple of required elements. One, you got to identify
the registration number of the trademark in question. Two, you need to say your
petitioner's name, email address, and domicile, and if it's a non-US domicile, you
have to designate a US attorney, obviously. Three, you have to identify the
6
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particular goods and services that are challenged. This is really important because
it can either be a full or a partial non-use. For example, if a registrant is only
utilizing your trademark for specific goods, but maintains the trademark in other
areas, the non-utilized portion of the trademark may be subject to expungement or
re-exam, but not the other part. Four, a verified statement from the petitioner that a
reasonable investigation was conducted.
Now, the USPTO expects this investigation to be pretty comprehensive,
because it's not enough to just prove that the trademark is not currently in use. The
petition needs to show that the trademark was never used or was not used prior to
the relevant date. Five, the evidence of non-use that the petitioner collects should
be documented and indexed and cited as part of the petition. Six, the PTO would
like their money. You have to pay a fee, it's $400 per class sought to be canceled.
After this process, the USPTO is going to take it from there.
Remember that both petitions for expungement and re-examination are
considered ex parte, meaning that the petitioner does not have an opportunity to
expand upon what they've already said, or to clarify their actions after they file their
petition. If the USPTO director determines their prima facie case has been
established, then the director will institute the proceeding.
The director is going to look at both the petition and the record evidence of
the registration. The USPTO will send a notice of their decision to institute the
proceeding to the petitioner. The notice is going to identify the goods and services
for which a prima facie case was made, and receipt of that notice does not
automatically remove the trademark, but it does switch the burden to the registrant,
who will then have three months from receipt of the notice to prove the use of their
trademark. Now, the registrant can get additional time again for a fee, they can get
another month for $125. How does all this play out? There's three possible
scenarios.
One is, if the registrant shows use of the trademark or excusable non-use for
all of the challenged goods or services, then the USPTO will issue a notice of
termination of the proceeding, and the registration will not be canceled. Or
alternatively, the registration can delete the challenged goods and services. The
USPTO will issue a notice of termination, the registration will be canceled in whole
or in part as to the deleted goods and services. Three, the other alternative is that
the register does not show use of the trademark, or does not establish excusable
non-use. For some or all of the goods or services or otherwise, fails to comply with
all outstanding requirements. In that caseMATTHEW D. ASBELL: If I can ask you just to hurry a little long, because
you're out of time.
JENNIFER SIMMONS: My apologies. In that case, the USPTO will issue
a final action addressing the registrant evidence and arguments. I'm going to just
skip to, what were some of the important things for INTA in our advocacy? We
advocated for the adoption of USPTO rules that achieved the objectives of the TMA
while imposing no greater burden than necessary on brand numbers. In particular,
we wanted fees that were not low enough to encourage abusive filings, but were
not too high to dissuade filings. We feel like $400 achieved the right call. We want
to propose in registered marks. That's why we advocated for a limit to the time
7
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period when a mark could be subject to proceedings, and we also wanted to stop as
to same goods or services to prevent abuse. I'm going to take a pause there and
cough a little bit off camera. Okay, thank you.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: I'm not sure if you're planning to come back, but
given the time constraints, you said you're taking a pause.
JENNIFER SIMMONS: I would pause. I'm happy to pause and catch-MATTHEW D. ASBELL: You can revisit the group.
JENNIFER SIMMONS: Yes, exactly. Sorry. My allergies are bothering me
so bad today, but I'm happy to answer questions and if we have additional time, I'm
happy to go into further discussion.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: Great. Thank you. I think we can try to maybe
do that at the end, unless there are some burning questions, but I want to give the
other speakers an opportunity to get their presentations in. With that, our next hot
topic is the SHOP SAFE Act. I can't even say it because I don't want to shop safe.
I'll ask professors Tushnet to give her presentation.
REBECCA TUSHNET: Great. This is just going to be basically a report I
think on what exactly SHOP SAFE is, and I'm not going to talk about the
companion bill, the INFORM Act, which has different provisions which is also in
going to conference and nobody knows. I think at this point, whether SHOP SAFE
will make it out of conference. It's in there now, coming from the house. In spirit
SHOPE SAFE is a follow-up to Article 17 in Europe. It departs from traditional
liability standards to create a new basis for liability.
Here, that's a new form of liability imposed on electronic commerce
platforms when a third-party uses a counterfeit mark for goods that implicate health
and safety, which of course are all goods since there's really no such thing as a good
that couldn't lead to what the definition is illness, disease, injury, serious adverse
event, allergic reaction or death, if it was improperly produced.
Platforms are covered if they have more than $500,000 in yearly sales, or if
they have less than that, but they have received 10 or more notices claiming
counterfeiting under SHOP SAFE, apparently through their entire existence. A
platform is any electronically access platform that includes publicly interactive
features that allow for arranging the sale or purchase of goods, or that enables a
person other than an operator of the platform to sell or off or physical goods to
consumers located in the US.
Twitter and Tumblr are apparently covered or might be covered, depending
on what people are doing on the sites. Facebook and Instagram, as well as Amazon
and Etsy and eBay will also be covered. Covered platforms will be liable, contribute
totally for counterfeiting, unless they've done all of the following. One, platform
has to confirm and periodically reconfirm that a seller has a US registered agent for
service of process. If the seller is located in the US and doesn't have a registered
agent, it has to have a verified address.
Two, separately, the platform has to verify through reliable documentation,
including to the extent possible, some form of government-issued identification,
the identity principle place of business, and contact information of the third-party
seller. Three, the platform must require third-party sellers to take reasonable steps
to verify the authenticity of their goods, and to attest that they have done so.
8
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However, the contract between the platform and the third-party seller does not have
to mandate verification where the third-party offers five or fewer goods of the same
type in connection with the same mark in a one-year period, as long as those goods
are offered for less than $5,000.
All platform contracts with third-party sellers must bar them from using
counterfeit marks, require them to consent to the jurisdiction of US courts, and
require them to designate an agent for service of process in the US or a verified US
address. Fourth, the platform must display conspicuously, the verified principle
place of business, contact information, and identity of a third-party seller, and the
country from which the goods were originally shipped, except the platform is not
required to display any information that constitutes the personal identity of an
individual, a residential street address, or personal contact information. In such
cases, the platform shall instead provide alternative verified means of contacting
the third-party seller. There are additional requirements for displaying country of
origin and additional requirements for images used, but the country of origin
information is subject to the exception for sales of five or fewer goods under $5,000
noted above. The other requirements are not subject to that exception. Fifth, the
platform must implement at no charge to trademark owners reasonable practice
measures for screening goods to prevent counterfeits. The reasonability
determination is not further defined, but courts are to consider the size and
resources of a platform, the available technological and non-technological solutions
at the time of screening, the information provided by the registrants to the platform,
and anything else they want.
Six, the platform must implement at no charge to trademark owners or
takedown regime. This is unlike DMCA notice and takedown because specific
notice is not required. Instead, a takedown obligation is incurred if the platform has
reasonable awareness of use of a counterfeit mark. This can be inferred based on
information about the use of a counterfeit mark on the platform generally, general
information about the third-party seller, identifying characteristics of a particular
listing or other circumstances as appropriate.
Seven, the platform must terminate sellers for repeated use of counterfeit
marks, which is typically three separate listings within one year. The platform
could, in theory, excuse that if it reasonably determines that the seller showed
reasonable mitigating circumstances.
Eighth, the platform must implement reasonable measures for screening
third-party sellers to ensure that sellers who've been terminated do not rejoin or
remain on the platform under a different seller identity or alias.
Ninth, the platform must also provide verified contact information to
registrants who have a bona fide belief that the seller used a counterfeit mark with
protections for individual contact information if there are alternative means of the
contacting the third-party seller. The statute also creates a new claim for knowing
material misrepresentations, and takedown notices. The sender can be liable for
damages to a third-party seller that is injured by such a misrepresentation, or if there
are 10 or more notices and the third-parties consent in writing, the sender can be
liable to the platform.

9
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There are also provisions for statutory damages of not less than $2,500 or
more than $15,000 per notice containing a known material misrepresentation, or if
there are aggravating circumstances, $15,000 to $75,000 per notice. The bill does
not define what would be more aggravating than a known material
misrepresentation. I admit I'm not confident that I can figure that out.
Some considerations we're thinking about. First, under current law, mark
can be counterfeit if the product has been too extensively repaired or altered to
count as the legitimate product, even if the alterations are disclosed to the buyer.
There may be some surprises for second-hand sellers and makers of bespoke
products, especially on sites like Etsy. Second, I'm not sure this has been fully
thought through, given the definition of platform and the triggers, it doesn't seem
required that the platform can collect any money from the sales, which is why I
mentioned Twitter and Tumblr, which also makes it perhaps a little hard to figure
out how the contract requirements are going to work.
I suppose platforms that think that there might be sales going on on their
platforms, will actually have to put into their contracts with everyone requiring
them to collect this information somehow or maybe saying, "If you're selling, we're
going to start requiring this information from you." How that will be triggered,
actually is difficult to figure out. This probably could have been fixed with better
drafting, that would tie the obligation to actually collecting some money from the
sales on the platform's behalf. Although, there was a hearing on this, it actually
didn't get changed. It just got dumped straight into the conference bill. I think that
that is a problem. But more generally, the liabilities are big, the exceptions are small
and largely irrelevant, since not having to put particular obligations in one's
contracts with third-party sellers isn't particularly important. We can probably
expect the platforms to do everything in the contract anyway.
The pre-screening requirements will be particularly difficult for vintage
handmade and custom items in particular. Despite the theoretical possibility of
fighting, knowing material misrepresentations based on our experience of other
regimes that have abuse provisions in them, it will be nonetheless quite easy for
trademark owners to crush resellers of legitimate goods.
In particular, the trademark owner will rarely know for sure that goods aren't
counterfeit and so it will be hard for them to make knowing material
misrepresentations. Probably false claims to suppress competition will also be
pretty easy, given that we know it's already a pretty significant problem on sites
like Amazon, where sometimes up to half of the claims in a particular channel are
actually bad faith attempts to get rid of the competition. We will see what happens.
At this point there's not much outside visibility, I think into the legislative process,
but watch this space. Thank you.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: Thanks very much, Rebecca. Are there questions
or comments on the SHOP SAFE Act? Crickets? Oh, wait, Maria sorry, go ahead.
MARIA A. SCUNGIO: Rebecca, does this also apply to apps that are not
technically traditional platforms, but for which there are advertisements embedded,
so social media apps and the like?
REBECCA TUSHNET: That is an excellent question. As I read it, I believe
the answer has to be yes. That is, the definition is quite broad. If it allows for
10
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arranging the sale or purchase of goods, which sounds like displays advertising or
enables a person other than the platform, to sell or offer to sell physical goods.
Again, that sounds very much like containing advertising 100%.
MARIA A. SCUNGIO: I agree with your perspective on it. In reading the
texts that are in circulation for SHOP SAFE, and SHOP SAFE as it exists now, it
almost feels like we're building the plane as we're flying the plane because I don't
think there's been that anticipation of what's going on with Instagram, TikTok and
other channels where you can look at posts and interspersed with the posts is
commercial behavior.
REBECCA TUSHNET: Actually, it seems likely that the drafters want to
cover Instagram, but I agree that I think they did not pay attention to the fact that
in drafting, they are actually covering every app that is ad-supported, which now
has to do these things if it has either $500,000 in yearly sales. By the way, that's not
even defined. I'm taking the logic of the law to say, well, that's probably sales
through the app, but it could be sales like off the app.
I don't know for sure. Maybe it's both, as certainly the expansive nature of
the coverage might lead a court to think well, it's either. Anyway, once you get 10
notices, it doesn't matter how much money you make a year, you're governed by
SHOP SAFE once you got 10 notices, and this is apparently over your entire life.
If you get one notice for a year inMARIA A. SCUNGIO: Very low bar.
REBECCA TUSHNET: Again, I think the failure to redraft and just shove
it into the conference bill has created some problems very distinguishable from the
TMA process that I think Ms. Simmons described quite well.
MARIA A. SCUNGIO: Thanks.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: Other questions or comments on SHOP SAFE?
I'm going to ask Matt, I think your name is Rephen. I'm going to ask you to reset
the timer, please, because I'm not sure why the timer is running now. Please reset
the timer and I'll call on Gerald Levine. He's going to give us an update on the
ACPA and domain name recovery. Go ahead, Gerald. Unmute. Your still on mute.
GERALD M. LEVINE: Thank you, Matthew. I'm going to be talking about
domain names infringing trademark rights. This is a different kind of tort than
trademark infringement. The commercialization of the internet dates from 1985.
The first domain names were registered in March of that year, and the first
cybersquatting case reached federal dockets in 1994. Between 1994 and 1999, there
was a slow beat of domain names dispute outside of the court system administered
by the then registry/registrar of domain names, Network Solution Inc. (NSI), and a
high rate of anxiety over this new tort of cybersquatting. NSI had implemented a
Policy in 1995 that suspended domain names.
In 1995 the Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA),
but its rules were insufficient to deal effectively with cybersquatting infringement
claims. In 1999, President Clinton signed the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act. Cybersquatting or cyberpiracy as it is styled in the statute is the act
of unlawfully registering domain names identical, or confusingly similar to
trademarks with the bad faith intent to profit from the targeted mark.
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Also in 1999, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) implemented the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP). The UDRP superseded the NSI Policy and the suspended domain names
were unlocked for mark owners to take action either under the UDRP or the ACPA.
A principal feature of the ACPA, and the subject of this brief presentation,
is that it provides for an alternative to in personam jurisdiction. Where an alleged
cyber squatter is either unknown or over whom the mark owner is unable to obtain
in personam jurisdiction, the court will permit it to pursue its cybersquatting claim
against the res, the domain name in an in-rem action. Jurisdiction over the res is
achieved through published notice in a newspaper selected by the Court. Should the
registrant appear it is not precluded from defending the registration.
My few remarks on in-rem jurisdiction will be directed to recovery of
fraudulently transferred domain names. Since these cases almost entirely involve
dot com domain names, the court of choice is the Eastern District of Virginia,
Alexandria Division. It is in this district that the domain name registry VeriSign,
Inc., the registry for the dot com top level domain has its headquarters and in which
the court has jurisdiction over the res.
The Alexandria division has proved particularly friendly to the argument
that monetizing and marketing domain names is a legitimate business enterprise
that supports common law rights. What makes it enticing to steal domain names is
answered by their sometimes astonishing values. Sales in the millions of dollars are
not unheard of.
The sheer value and sometimes easy picking incites thieves to fraudulently
access registrar accounts and transfer valuable domain names to other registrars.
Registrants may not learn they have been victimized for many months. The first
question for investor victims however who have no formal trademarks is whether
they have standing under the ACPA to maintain an action for recovering stolen
domain names.
The lead case from the Alexandria Division, Weitzman v. Lead Networks,
decided in 2010, involved the transfer of 19 domain names. The court determined
in essence that use of domain names to promote a plaintiff's business is sufficient
to establish a common law trademark. It said that "Through plaintiff's long-standing
continuous and exclusive use of the domain names, plaintiff owns valid and
enforceable rights to each of the registered domain names."
The court concluded that “legal precedent dictates that plaintiff's domain
names should be afforded the protection of the ACPA.” While this view of investor
monetizing reseller rights has largely been adopted, investor victims are not totally
in the clear because of the court's initial position in a 2019 case, Yoshika v. John
Doe. This court stated that it was, "Especially concerned about prospect of granting
a relief when plaintiff's only use for domain names is domain monetization."
Nevertheless, on a final reckoning, Yoshika prevailed except as to one
domain name transferred to an intervenor. Thus, a principal consideration in
restoring domain names lost to fraudulent transfers to investors must be whether
plaintiff is, "Engaged in the type of activity that ACPA was intended to remedy."
If they are perceived to be violating the ACPA, they cannot expect any sympathy
from the court.
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There is also another route to fraudulent transfer judgment. In a recent case
from the Alexandria Division, council creatively combined the ACPA for its inrem feature with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 in Aiping Wei v.a
number of domain names, the court granted default judgment, quieting the title
under the CFAA and returning the domain names to plaintiff's account.
Rather than go through the trouble of inventing new brand names from
scratch, businesses have come to rely on brokers and auction services for
appropriate names, sometimes to the dismay of purchasers who are later sued by
plaintiff victims of fraudulent transfer.
The poster case on this is a 2020 case from the Southern District of Florida.
It featured an in-rem action that include an in-personam action against the hapless
purchaser of calculator.com. Hapless because the purchaser paid $180,000 for the
domain name only to have calculator.com forfeited to plaintiff without having a
remedy to recover his out-of-pocket losses.
The general rule under common law is that "One who purchases no matter
how innocently from a thief, or all subsequent purchases from the thief acquires no
title in the property. Title always remains with the true owner." The notion traces
its lineage to Roman law. No one gives what he does not have.
If you have any questions please post them.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: Thanks very much. I don't see any questions in
the queue online. If there's audience members that do have a question or a comment,
I'd like to encourage you to please raise that or put it in the queue. I'd also like to
just give Jenny an opportunity to finish up on anything she wanted to say since I
cut her short. Then we can have some discussion. Maria maybe you'll wish to chime
in. Jenny, do you have anything that you wish to add on to the end of yours since
IJENNIFER SIMMONS: Yes.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: Go ahead.
JENNIFER SIMMONS: Thanks, Matt. Actually, it was quite fortunate
timing as I was having a coughing set no less. That worked out quite well.
Hopefully, I can get through this. I'll pick up with some of the important aspects of
INTA’s advocacy. I went through the feeds and the assemble and the repose. We
were very fortunate that USPTO did a great job with their rulemaking and listened
intently and seemed to respond to those suggestions.
We were also concerned about abuse of the process. I would note that in the
final rulemaking, USPTO did say, "Look we're going to keep an eye on whether or
not these proceedings are used for abuse." They reserve the right to require at a later
point in time, real parties' interests. We're very pleased that USPTO did such a great
job with implementing the TMA.
I think the million-dollar question here is, now what? What does all this
mean? Just to give you a super quick snapshot of where we are right now. As of the
last entry when I checked last night on the USPTO's website, there were about 32
re-exam petitions and about 34 expungement petitions. This is so new, since
December of 2021, we don't have a whole lot of practice to be able to draw upon.
But, I will say, the USPTO has put out some helpful hints and into 100%
agrees with the do's and the don'ts, which I'll just relate very briefly. In terms of
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what petitioners should be doing, they should be as specific as they can as to what
is not in use. They absolutely should index their evidence, making a separate page
and linking to the specific evidence. They should provide documentation for
absolutely everything, even if a search results in a null set.
They should show evidentiary support and detailed evidence for what is not
in use for each little service, they shouldn't just rely on the USPTO, they have to
provide the evidence. In terms of the don'ts, we've heard from the USPTO that
sometimes practitioners are filing URLs that are so small you can barely read them
or you can't read them at all, that's a no-no. You can't just provide evidence of
current non-use alone and think that's going to save your day, that will not, you will
have a bad day then.
You can't assume that one bad specimen goes to the entire class, and you
can't or you shouldn't just cite to an entire record of another registration, you should
just really cite to the relevant portion. Those are just some of the best practices or
tips that the USPTO has put out and our members are telling us are absolutely spot
on. That was it. Thank you for the extra time, Matt.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: Thanks. Professor Tushnet?
REBECCA TUSHNET: I don't know how many people might have had the
chance to look at yesterday's Bacardi decision from the 9th Circuit, but I think that
actually goes to both the expungement and also what Marshall was talking about
because it relies on the Memoji decision. It has a very interesting holding that might
be of some relevance to expungement proceedings. Which is that if you know that
you're heading for a use fight, about whether you have bona fide use, then the fact
finder may, and sometimes must disregard actions you took because you knew that
you were in a genuine use fight.
I just find that fascinating, and I wonder to what extent it is going to be
applicable in expungement proceedings. If anyone has thoughts, I'm just interested
in people's reactions.
[crosstalk]
REBECCA TUSHNET: [laughs] My apologies. I think I'm going to refrain
from commenting. I have no rush.
MARIA A. SCUNGIO: I wanted to mention something following on
Jenny's presentation and weaving in Rebecca what you just said. I've understood,
and Jenny correct me if I'm wrong, that when a registrant is defending in this exparte cancellation lane, that the material to show that there was actually trademark
use need not fully fit into what we would regard as acceptable trademark
specimens?
JENNIFER SIMMONS: That is my understanding as well, yes.
MARIA A. SCUNGIO: While these tools are available for brand owners to
sort of pitch in to attack the challenge of improving the condition of the register
because that is I think the spirit in part of what these tools allow, and it's sort of a
special highway, a faster track if you will, procedurally than a full-blown TTAB
cancellation proceeding. I do think there's been some thought given to the
counterweight. What does the evidence look like and do we have to hold everybody
up to what would be a traditional examination standard or a traditional maintenance
standard?
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I have a practical question out of that because I think this is great and
ambitious and hats off to the PTO. [chuckles] But, the PTO, they're great about
publishing their data for their productivity, and the over/under, if you look at their
data for how many oppositions in the door and how many cancellations in the door
from the most recent annual report, and then you look at the data of how many of
those cases have been concluded right now, we're at equipoise.
If you look at this early day of about 60-plus petitions that are in hopper and
even the earliest most one, I think their deadline is not until May 4 or May 5 to
come in with their answer. How's the trademark office to the extent you know, how
are they going to cope with volume when us stakeholders out in the universe have
seen enough to look at the procedure and say, "Yes, this is pretty good, let's go for
it."?
Because the trademark office is digging out of really a considerable backlog
and some of it has to do with the change in market conditions, the internet, COVID,
e-commerce exploding, certain ex-US actors exploding with their application,
attack if you will. I'm not blaming, I'm just curious. [laughs] What do you think?
JENNIFER SIMMONS: I certainly could not speak for the USPTO, but my
understanding or my belief is that this is part of entire suite of products if you will,
that are designed to address the problems that you just mentioned. I don't think any
one tool is going to fix the problem, in fact, I think it's the combined effect that
they're hoping will move this forward. Just as a practical matter, USPTO didn't have
much of a choice here. This is what congress told them to do. [laughs]
MARIA A. SCUNGIO: Very true.
JENNIFER SIMMONS: Like it or not this is the world that we live in, so I
think that-- Yes, I'm not sure that this alone, these proceedings alone are the magic
bullet. I do think that you have to look at them in combination with the audit
program, the US council rule, the fraud crackdown. All these different things, the
identification verification.
MARIA A. SCUNGIO: Right and also the letters of protest that just
basically formalizes what was already available, and I think it's actually a pretty
useful tool.
JENNIFER SIMMONS: Absolutely. That was one of the-- There were a lot
of different comments that INTA had at various stages of the process, both leading
up to enactment after enactment, and during the rulemaking process, and we've
always been supportive of the letter of protest. It's just basically a codification of
that existing practice.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: USPTO never said that this was supposed to be
a magic bullet, and I think a lot of us out in the world were looking at it that way,
but I think they've actually said that it's not. I agree with what Jenny said in terms
of it being part of a bunch of tools. To the extent that there is any one tool, that is a
magic bullet, it's one that wasn't mentioned, which is the sanctions process. That is
where the trademark office is really cracking down on numbers.
When you consider these, you look at these ex-parte proceedings, you've
had 60 something of these filed in the four or five months since it's been available,
it's not a lot, but the amount of work that goes into it, both on the outside counsel,
lawyer side, or the petitioner side is fairly expensive. A lot more than would be
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needed to file a petition for cancellation because you only have pleadings there, and
you consider USPTO resources.
They have dedicated personnel dealing with this. They're speeding up and
they say they're speeding up, in terms of processing them but nonetheless, they have
to decide whether or not to institute a proceeding, and then if they do institute a
proceeding they then have to go through that. I see how it's faster, I see how it will
be faster, but it's taking out one, two, three registrations at a time. Even though their
costs, official government fees are on a per-class basis, the attorneys doing this
work because they need evidence for each specific item challenged is significant
and ends up being really costly upfront.
You could chance it and try to get a default in cancellation and it would be
cheaper and easier. There's nothing to stop you from doing these things
concurrently, except for a point that Jenny made about, "You can't withdraw your
petition."
MARSHALL LEAFFER: I have a question for Jenny as well as a kind of a
follow-up for Matthew and Maria's points. It's just a very basic one that we all I
think agree with the laudatory goals of cleaning up the registry and all of that. You
mentioned the statistics here. They seem to be kind of paltry, it's just because it's
going to take time for this thing to start running and do speed, or is it something
very basic?
Matthew has just got through saying, this gets back to something very basic
about maybe some of the costliness of the system for instituting the procedures
involved. What's the word on the street? Are people happy with these statistics or
not?
JENNIFER SIMMONS: [laughs] I don't know that I can speak for all of our
members I think our members have different viewpoints. I will tell you some of the
comments that I have heard is there's reluctance to be the first after the first mover
here. It's easier to sit and wait and see what your colleagues are doing and see how
this plays out. There's a lot of just unknown. The other comment that I have
routinely heard which Matt alluded to is that most lawyers can crank out a wellpleaded complaint [laughs] real easily.
You can file your petition at the TTAB they've got that down, they've done
it for years and years. This is new, this is different, and we're creatures of habit, and
we don't like new stuff. [laughs] That increases the cost alone and not exactly
knowing, you know to Maria's point exactly what will rebut the prima facie case.
What do we need to be getting from our clients in the first place? There are just a
lot of unknowns. I think that that in my view is probably some of the cause of the
low statistics at this point.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: I want to supplement that if I can and Rebecca
would like to say something as well. If I can supplement that because I have a
different perspective as an outside practitioner. I have been following this and
following this since before it was a law. I have been looking for opportunities to do
this and I have not had an instance of an opportunity. I've had numerous problems
with prior registrations, et cetera.
This is a narrow scope of registrations to which the supplies and it's done at
a time where there's lot of in incoming applications which are not subject to this.
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There haven't been opportunities. Believe me, if I thought there was an opportunity,
I would be pitching it to my clients as an option. I would be able to determine what
they think it's too costly. They'd rather do a cancellation. That's not coming up.
There's just not many opportunities to do it. Rebecca, go ahead.
REBECCA TUSHNET: This is just chiming in with a variation which I
think we haven't discussed the renewal audit. The pilot program which I think is
incredibly important including for the reasons that you talk about, about
opportunities. For those of you who aren't familiar with this, the pilot program
where they just said they asked people who were semi-randomly selected, provide
us with another specimen, right.
Not a specimen for everything, but just another specimen like you choose
within your class. When asked, 70% of the people or the registrants who were asked
for this, deleted goods and services rather than complying and of that 30% of them
just gave up entirely. Meaning, by the way, that they had faked or at least
misrepresented the specimen that they had sent the first time before they were
audited. The whole thing was canceled.
There's a big problem, but it probably does deserve an institutional-level
response. The audit has the benefit of being initiated, not because there's some
specific competitor who needs to know that there's something to look for, but that
it's quality control within the PTO itself. Any resources we can encourage them to
devote to that, I think will have a much greater payoff, in fact, than many of these.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: Maria.
MARIA A. SCUNGIO: Really quickly, if I can just add on to that. Matt,
maybe you agree. For non-US domicile trademark owners who are legitimate and
relatively pure of heart when they go to registration, [laughs] and who are
frequently flummoxed by our US system which is not consonant with most of the
rest of the world. For which broad identifications are going to be the rocks on which
you will crash your boat eventually. [laughs] Some of these changes and so the PTO
has been looking at this problem for a very long time, Jenny, as you've said, this is
not a new day and a new page.
There has been a cascade and accumulation of efforts with audit programs,
renewal, and maintenance to scratch at the clutter on the register, particularly for
registrations with full class headings. Those of us in the counseling community
always are encouraging and reminding of the use it or lose it three years’
abandonment problem. This change, this moment of the TMA has really woken
people up to these concerns. Not just about new tools, but how these new tools will
be used against you to reconstruct what might have not been going on in your
business cabinet for the last three to five years despite US council's encouragement.
I think that is another reason, Jenny, maybe why you also are seeing this
pause. Okay, how deep is the ocean? Or the cliff that we're going to be tossed off
of for not having had a best practice in place for a 7 class or an 8 class with the 82
lines for each class? To poach from our metaverse NFT environment, it's a meta
question. It's a philosophical question which should continue to be asked. I think
it's important.
MATTHEW D. ASBELL: If you look at this from the perspective of the
registrar being challenged it's relatively easy to address it. There's no penalty as
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there is in an audit if you respond and say that you're not using it and delete those
goods. Yes, I agree. I think there's an increased awareness about it. I think that we
as US council are counseling more and more about it. We're concerned. We know
the USPTO is concerned, but in the end, I don't see it changing behavior. It's
changed my behavior.
For instance, one way in which it's changed my behavior is when I-- A lot
of US council, when you help a client get a trademark registered in the US, once
it's registered, you send them the certificate. If there's nothing else to be done, you
don't talk to them again for five, six years. We didn't talk about this, but a big
problem has been fraudulent solicitations. All these people coming out and saying,
"Oh, your registrations coming due." "Oh, you need watch services," whatever it is
based on the address of the USPTO.
When they get those, they get those with frequency. Some clients of mine
have made the mistake of paying those. It's an ongoing problem. That as well as
this have triggered me and my practice to send an annual status report on
registrations to all my clients. I also know that I can't charge them for it. They are
not going to, especially the foreign ones, never going to tolerate that.
There's this extra work that now has to go in sort of, "Hey, do you have
some use evidence? Maybe you can send me some use evidence now." "Maybe you
can send me some use evidence now," and just keep collecting it because they're
not going to. What's going to happen if one of these other organizations sends them
a solicitation and they make that payment? They get burned and you try to keep
them from getting burned.
I've got to keep thinking, "Hey, they're going to send you fraudulent
solicitations, but here I am I'm still here. Don't forget me. I'm not going to let five
years go away before you talk to me." That's how I've dealt with it, but I don't think
it will change behavior on the part of foreign registrants or US registrants. I think
they'll just defend or not defend. They're not really penalized other than have to
narrow the scope of the registrations.
We're at one o'clock. Thank you much for the thoughtful discussion and
presentations.
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